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Refusal to Have Children as a Ground for
Divorce or Annulment
Marvin M. Moore*
W HEN A HUSBAND AND WIFE agree to practice birth control
no legal problems are normally created. In England and
now in all American jurisdictions' the use of contraceptive de-
vices and techniques is perfectly lawful, 2 and only three states
impose restrictions on voluntary sterilization. 3 In fact, there is
considerable evidence that our society not only permits birth
control but considers it highly desirable.
4
However, a different situation is presented when contracep-
tion is practiced by one spouse against the will of the other. The
offending spouse remains free of criminal liability,5 but he may
be vulnerable to some form of marital legal action by his mate.
The purpose of this article is to examine the circumstances under
which such marital legal action is available to the aggrieved
spouse.
In England, where "wilful refusal of the respondent to con-
sumrnmate the marriage" is a ground for annulment, the courts
have been confronted with the question of whether the refusal
to have uncontracepted intercourse constitutes a refusal to con-
summate the marriage. This question first arose in the case of
Cowen v. Cowen.7 The parties were married in 1932 and lived
in Persia until 1937, when they returned to England for a few
months. During their stay in Persia the couple agreed that con-
traception was necessary since Persia's primitive medical and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron, College of Law.
1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 33 U. S. Law Week 4587, __ U. S. , S. Ct.
L. Ed. __ (1965).
2 However, a number of states place restrictions on the sale of contracep-
tives. See Sulloway, The Legal and Political Aspects of Population Control
in the United States, 25 Law and Contemp. Prob. 593, 601-02 (1960).
3 Connecticut, Kansas and Utah. See Ridgeway, Birth Control by Surgery,
The New Republic, p. 9 (Nov. 14, 1964).
4 Among such evidence is the following: the establishment in most states of
private agencies offering family planning services, the inclusion of such
services in the public health programs of several jurisdictions, and the
position favorable to birth control taken by most periodical and newspaper
articles on the subject.
5 Supra n. 1.
6 Matrimonial Causes Act (1950) 14 Geo. 6 c. 25.
7 (1946) P. 36, (1945) 2 All. E. R. 197.
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sanitary conditions rendered child-bearing very dangerous.
However, when the two returned to England the wife asked her
husband to abandon his precautionary measures so that she
might have a child. He refused. At the end of 1937, the couple
returned to Persia, where conditions had recently improved, and
the husband continued to practice contraception, notwithstand-
ing his wife's frequently-voiced opposition. In 1944 the latter
left her husband, returned to England, and sued for an annul-
ment on the ground quoted above. The Court of Appeals de-
cided that the marriage should be annulled, saying:
We are of the opinion that sexual intercourse cannot be said
to be complete when a husband deliberately discontinues the
act of intercourse before it has reached its natural termina-
tion, or when he artificially prevents that natural termina-
tion, which is the passage of the male seed into the body of
the woman. To hold otherwise would be to affirm that a
marriage is consummated by an act so performed that one
of its principal ends, if not the principal end of marriage
(the procreation of children), is frustrated.8
The position taken by the Court of Appeals in the Cowen
case merits criticism on at least five different grounds:
First, if a spouse's natural sterility does not preclude con-
summation of a marriage (a point which the court expressly
conceded) ," it seems strange that artificial sterility (contracep-
tion) should do so. True, the latter is deliberate and the for-
mer is not, but if the ability to procreate is not essential to the
accomplishment of a valid marriage in the first place, it is odd
that the deliberate curtailment of this ability should render the
marriage voidable.
Secondly, since no method of contraception other than
sterilization is foolproof,1 ° the consummation test set forth by
the court presents an almost insuperable evidence problem. Al-
though the rubber sheath, the diaphragm, and the pessary are
all considered reasonably reliable, if the sheath is torn even
slightly, if the diaphragm is dislodged or improperly placed, or
8 2 Id. at 199.
9 Ibid.
10 "Today there are many medically approved mechanical and chemical
methods of limiting family size available .... Effective as these birth control
methods may be, they are not now one hundred percent certain. . ....
Pamphlet entitled "A Statement of Purpose and Program," published by
Human Betterment Association for Voluntary Sterilization, p. 2 (1964).
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if the pessary is defectively made, there may be a "passage of
the male seed into the body of the woman." If coitus interruptus
is employed, the chances that such an unintended result will
occur are obviously considerable. In a given annulment action
how can the court be certain (even reasonably certain) that the
form of contraception used by the parties has always accom-
plished its purpose? 11
Thirdly, even at the time of the Cowen decision, birth con-
trol had become so prevalent a practice in England and other
occidental countries that it no longer accorded with common
parlance to read into "consummation" the requirement that
sperm pass into the woman's body.
Fourthly, the religious authorities responsible for the doc-
trine that the principal purpose of marriage is procreation-
namely the Bible, the Book of Common Prayer, and the Koran-
were all written at a time when the death rate was high and
the world was thinly populated. During the past forty years the
death rate has been greatly reduced in most countries, and the
world's population has multiplied so rapidly that the population
explosion has become a grave threat to human welfare. 12
And fifthly, since emission usually is not essential to the
crime of rape, 13 the result of the Cowen decision is that sexual
intercourse for criminal law purposes is not sexual intercourse
for marriage law purposes. Although marriage law is not con-
strained to follow the criminal law, an inconsistency of the kind
in question is nevertheless difficult to accept without hesita-
tion.
The first three of the above considerations influenced the
decision of the House of Lords in Baxter v. Baxter,14 a case
which elicited more newspaper and periodical comment in
England than any decision involving religious doctrine since
the Free Church of Scotland case in 1904.15 The facts were
these: The parties were married in 1934 and lived together
11 If an oral contraceptive (a device that did not exist in 1946) or a sperm-
killing foam were employed, this clearly would not prevent consummation
of the marriage, as defined by Cowen v. Cowen, even though conception
would be prevented.
12 See Shimm and Everett, Population Control, The Imminent World Crisis
1-12 (1961).
13 Clark and Marshall, Treatise on the Law of Crimes 676 (6th ed. 1952).
14 (1947) 2 All. E. R. 886, 4 A. L. R. 2d 216 (1949).
15 Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun (1904), A. C. 515.
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until 1944, when the husband moved out. Throughout the
couple's ten years of cohabitation the wife refused to have coitus
unless her husband wore a rubber sheath. The latter persistently
implored his wife to engage in uncontracepted sexual relations,
but she proved adamant, and he never attempted to employ
force. Shortly after leaving his wife the husband petitioned for
an annulment on the ground that his mate had wilfully refused
to consummate their marriage. The trial court and Court of
Appeal decided that the marriage had not been consummated,
but dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff's conduct
suggested acquiescence and therefore produced a waiver of his
right to complain. The House of Lords affirmed the dismissal,
but stated that the waiver issue was irrelevant, since the mar-
riage had been consummated within the meaning of the annul-
ment statute. The House of Lords added that the decision of
the Cowen case on this point was overruled.
After observing that the natural sterility of a spouse had
never been held to preclude consummation, the House said:
The essence of the matter . . . is that the children, if there
be any, should be born into a family as that word is under-
stood in Christendom generally . . . But this is not the same
thing as saying that a marriage is not consummated unless
children are procreated or that procreation of children is
the principal end of marriage. 16
Referring to the evidence problem created by the doctrine
laid down in Cowen v. Cowen, the House observed:
The argument of this appeal exposed the morass of diffi-
culties in which the courts must necessarily become in-
volved in applying the principles laid down in Cowen v.
Cowen . . . It was admitted that a rupture of a sheath . . .
on a single occasion would involve that the marriage had
been consummated, though unwillingly and unintentionally
I am unable to believe that Parliament . . . intended
that the courts should be involved in inquiries of this sort.17
Finally, the House noted that it was contrary to modern
thought and practice to assert that sexual intercourse with con-
traceptives does not constitute consummation. Quoting further:
Long before 1937 it was a matter of common knowledge that
reputable clinics had come into existence for the purpose
of advising spouses on . . . birth control. It was also a
16 Baxter v. Baxter, supra n. 14, at 890.
'7 Id. at 891-92.
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matter of common knowledge that many young married
couples agree to take contraceptive precautions in the early
days of married life. I take the view that in this legislation
Parliament used the word 'consummate' as that word is
understood in common parlance and in the light of social
conditions known to exist'18
In deciding the Baxter case the House of Lords expressly
withheld opinion on the question of whether coitus interruptus
would constitute consummation within the meaning of the an-
nulment statute (Matrimonial Causes Act). This question di-
rectly confronted the courts in three subsequent cases: Crimes
v. Crimes,1 White v. White,20 and Cackett v. Cackett.21 In the
Crimes controversy, the Probate Divorce, and Admiralty Divi-
sion granted an annulment to a wife who testified that her hus-
band always restricted their sexual contact to coitus inter-
ruptus. The court declared that coitus interruptus is not a full
and natural intercourse, but rather a partial and incomplete
sexual act that cannot reasonably be deemed to constitute "con-
summation" within the intent of the annulment act.
However, in White v. White, which was decided two days
later, the same Division (with a different judge) reached the
opposite conclusion on similar facts. The court granted the
plaintiff-wife a divorce on the ground of cruelty, since the re-
spondent's conduct (including acts unrelated to their sexual
relations) had impaired her health, but the court stated that the
marriage had been consummated within the meaning of the an-
nulment statute. Said the court:
It is submitted on behalf of the wife that there is no vera
copula unless there is not only full entry and penetration
but also completion of the act within the body of the wom-
an . . . On the other hand it is contended (by respondent)
that there is a complete conjunction of bodies, a vera copula
... as soon as full entry and penetration has been
achieved . .. In my judgment the latter contention must be
correct.
22
In Cackett v. Cackett, decided two years later, the court
again granted the petitioner-wife a divorce on the ground of
18 Id. at 892.
19 (1948) P. 323.
20 (1948) P. 330.
21 (1950) P. 253.
22 White v. White, supra n. 20, at 338.
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cruelty, because of her showing of acts by the respondent in-
jurious to her health. But the court declared that it accepted
the White case's view that coitus interruptus is sufficient to con-
summate a marriage.
England recognizes fraud as a ground for annulment, but
the fraud must produce a misconception as to the identity of
the person with whom the marriage contract is made or as to
the nature of the ceremony. 23 Consequently, there are no
English decisions granting an annulment to a complainant whose
mate falsely promised, expressly or impliedly, to have children
following the parties' marriage.
In the United States wilful refusal to consummate the mar-
riage is nowhere an express ground for annulment or divorce,
nor is refusal to copulate without contraceptives. Nevertheless,
if an American husband or wife, contrary to his partner's wishes,
insists upon precautionary measures as a prerequisite to coitus,
the latter spouse may not be without a remedy. For he may be
able to obtain an annulment for fraud, a divorce for desertion,
or possibly a divorce for cruelty.24
In most states a consummated marriage can be annulled on
the ground of fraud if it "goes to the essentials" of the marriage
relationship.25 A number of cases have held that the requisite
fraud exists where one party has expressly and falsely promised
before marriage that he would have children afterward. Two
such cases are Coppo v. Coppo,26 and Stegienko v. Stegienko.27
In the Coppo case the respondent-wife not only promised
before marriage that she would have children by plaintiff, but
even showed him baby clothes that she had kept from her for-
mer marriage. After the marriage ceremony, however, defend-
ant told plaintiff that she would not have sexual relations with
him unless he used means to prevent conception, and a few
months later she told him that she did not intend to have children
23 12 Halsbury, Laws of England 224 (3rd ed. 1955). An annulment is also
obtainable on the fraud-related ground of concealed pregnancy by another
man at the time of the marriage. Matrimonial Causes Act, op. cit. supra n. 6.
24 A divorce on the ground of cruelty is not obtainable unless the refusal to
engage in uncontracepted sexual relations is coupled with other objection-
able conduct. See n. 51, infra.
25 Clark, Domestic Relations § 15 (1954). An unconsummated marriage may
be annulled for any fraud which would be sufficient to annual an ordinary
contract. 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Annulment of Marriage § 13 (1962).
26 163 Misc. 249, 297 N. Y. S. 744 (1937).
27 295 Mich. 530, 295 N. W. 252 (1940).
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at any time during their marriage and that she never had en-
tertained such as intention. Immediately upon hearing this reve-
lation plaintiff left his wife, and shortly thereafter he sued for
an annulment on the ground of fraud. Said the court:
The primary condition which he (plaintiff) placed upon the
marriage was that defendant would have children by him.
This was in his mind a most important essential of the
marriage relationship . . .2
(T) he conclusion is inescapable that the misrepresentations
and promises of the defendant induced the plaintiff to enter
into the marriage relationship with her; that such promises
were fraudulent in purpose; and thereby a fraud was per-
petrated by the defendant upon the plaintiff at the inception
of the marriage relation, which continued until the final
declaration and confession by the defendant that she at the
time of making such promises had no intention of keeping
or fulfilling them.2 9
The significant facts in the Stegienko controversy were these:
During their courtship plaintiff told defendant that he wanted
to have children, and she replied that she "would like to have a
little girl and more children if we could afford it." 30 However,
when the parties arrived home after the wedding defendant re-
fused to have sexual intercourse with plaintiff unless he used
a contraceptive device, explaining that she was afraid to become
pregnant because of an operation which she had undergone.
Plaintiff immediately left his bride and two days after their
marriage filed suit for an annulment. The lower court dismissed
the action, but the Supreme Court of Michigan vacated the de-
cree of dismissal and remanded for entry of an annulment de-
cree. Quoting the court:
(T)he evidence and all the circumstances in the case suf-
ficiently prove that defendant misled plaintiff into the mar-
riage by fraudulently pretending that she desired to have
children; and that because of her physical condition she did
not intend to have normal marital intercourse with plain-
tiff. Her entering into the marriage upon, such misrepre-
sentation and with such intentions entitles plaintiff to a de-
cree of annulment.3 1
28 Coppo v. Coppo, supra n. 26, at 755 of 297 N. Y. S.
29 Id. at 751.
30 Stegienko v. Stegienko, supra n. 27, at 253 of 295 N. W.
31 Id. at 254.
Sept., 1965
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In several cases the courts have carried the reasoning ex-
pressed in the Coppo and Stegienko decisions one step further
and have granted an annulment on the ground of fraud where
the promise to have children was merely implied. Two illustra-
tive cases are Lembo v. Lembo,3 2 and Pisciotta v. Buscino.3 3
In the Lembo case the referee found that the complainant-
wife had entered marriage with the expectation of having
children although defendant had never expressly represented
that he would father children.
Beginning immediately after the marriage ceremony, de-
fendant insisted upon the use of preventive measures, and it
soon became apparent to plaintiff that defendant never intended
to have offspring. She thereupon sued for an annulment, claim-
ing fraud. The court granted plaintiff the relief requested,
saying:
Fraud in inducing one to marry in reliance upon an express
promise to have children, which promise the party had no
intention of keeping, is of course, a ground of annulment.
The question presented is whether an annulment of marriage
may be decreed where there is no express promise to have
children . . . (Where) parties agree to enter into marriage
there is, in such consent, an implied representation by each
to have children of the union, and no express representa-
tion is required, and a continual refusal by one of them to
have issue of the marriage, without any adequate excuse,
constitutes a fraud affecting the validity of the marriage and
entitling the aggrieved spouse to an annulment of the mar-
riage. 34
The factual situation in the Pisciotta controversy was al-
legedly this: Before their marriage the parties agreed that the
wife should continue working afterwards until certain debts of
the husband were paid and that contraception should be prac-
ticed during this period. However, the plaintiff (wife) assumed
that as soon as respondent's debts were discharged the two
would have children. After the couple had been married for
five months, respondent's obligations were satisfied, and plaintiff
suggested dispensing with contraception. This triggered an
argument, and in the course of same respondent revealed that
he had never intended to have children, that he did not desire
32 193 Misc. 1055, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 206 (1949).
33 22 N. J. Super. 114, 91 A. 2d 629 (1952).
34 Lembo v. Lembo, supra n. 32, at 208-09 of 86 N. Y. S. 2d.
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any now, and that he wanted plaintiff to continue working in-
definitely. On the morning following the dispute, respondent
moved out. The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court disbelieved much of the testimony presented by plaintiff
(as did the Chancery Division) and therefore dismissed the suit.
But the court declared:
Undoubtedly if a prospective husband or wife prior to the
marriage formed a fixed determination never to have chil-
dren, did not communicate that fact to the intended spouse,
and then refused to engage in marital relations without
contraception, fraud of the required character would exist
* * .Where nothing is said prior to the marriage on the sub-
ject of children, it is presumed that he or she intends to
enter the marriage contract with all the implications, in-
cluding a willingness to have children.35
The doctrine that engaged couples impliedly promise to have
children (in the absence of statements to the contrary) seems
consistent with the generally accepted rule that a promise to
marry implies a promise to have sexual intercourse.3 However,
the courts have evidenced a propensity to restrict the use of the
former doctrine more severely than they have the latter. The
courts have effectuated this restriction by invoking the prin-
ciple of waiver whenever the facts of the particular case have
permitted. Among the cases illustrating the courts' employ-
ment of the waiver principle are Gerwitz v. Gerwitz37 and
Schwind v. Schwind.38
In the former case it appeared that shortly before the parties'
marriage they had a conversation concerning children and that
defendant (husband) at least impliedly promised to have issue.
However, for the first few months after their marriage defend-
ant consistently adopted precautionary measures, and after this
practice had continued for six months plaintiff reminded de-
fendant of their pre-marital discussion. The latter replied that he
was not yet interested in having children. Three months later
plaintiff brought up the subject again, and defendant said that
35 Pisciotta v. Buscino, supra n. 33, at 631 of 91 A. 2d.
36 The rule implying a promise to have sexual relations is stated as follows
at 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Annulment of Marriage § 17 (1962): "An intent on the
part of one of the parties existing at the time of the marriage ceremony not
to consummate the marriage by sexual intercourse, if persisted in after the
marriage, is generally held to justify annulment of the marriage for fraud.
37 66 N. Y. S. 2d 327 (1945).
38 99 N. Y. S. 2d 108 (1950).
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he did not want children, since they would annoy him. The
matter was again discussed on subsequent occasions, but de-
fendant persisted in the use of contraceptives, and finally-after
four years of marriage-plaintiff left her husband and sued for
an annulment on the ground of fraud. The court dismissed
plaintiff's petition and stated:
Plaintiff admitted she discovered the alleged fraud within
six months after the marriage . . . Thereafter she continued
to live and cohabit with defendant for three and one half
years . . . While lapse of time is alone not conclusive . . .
in the absence of other circumstances it negatives a claim of
fraud. Continued cohabitation with full knowledge of the
fraud is a bar.39
Prior to their marriage in 1938 the parties in the Schwind
case agreed that plaintiff would continue working afterwards
until she became pregnant, but there was no understanding that
measures would be taken to delay pregnancy. However, after
their marriage, defendant persuaded his wife to accept contra-
ception until they could afford to build a home. In 1942 the
couple moved into their new home, but shortly thereafter de-
fendant was drafted. He was discharged in 1943 but had difficulty
finding employment suitable to him, and this served as an excuse
to continue preventive measures. Defendant's employment prob-
lem was eventually solved, and in 1950 plaintiff proposed that
they raise a family. Defendant replied that he had never in-
tended to have offspring and was not so inclined now. The con-
versation became heated, and defendant left. Plaintiff initiated
an annulment action on the ground of fraud, and the court dis-
missed the suit, saying:
Nearly twelve years had elapsed since their marriage, and
. . . she went along . . . acquiescing in the continuous use
of contraceptives. Thus she allowed years of their life to
slip by without insisting on. . . a family. . . Had her eager-
ness for children been as real as she now claims, I do not
understand why, in the face of his persistent procrastination,
she had to wait for him to put into words what his conduct
so loudly proclaimed.40
Although the prevailing view is to the contrary,4 1 in at least
one state a spouse can obtain a divorce on the ground of deser-
39 Gerwitz v. Gerwitz, supra n. 37, at 330.
40 Schwind v. Schwind, supra n. 38, at 109-10.
41 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation §§ 125, 126 (1957).
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tion if his mate unjustifiably refuses, for the statutory desertion
period, to have uncontracepted coitus. 4 2 This rule represents an
extension of the doctrine that a wilful refusal to have any sexual
contact constitutes desertion if continued for the statutory period.
The latter rule, which is recognized by a substantial minority of
jurisdictions, 43 has been justified primarily on the ground that
a Platonic marriage cannot accomplish a major purpose of wed-
lock, namely the procreation of children.4 4 Since copulation
with contraception is (assuming that the precautions are effec-
tive) as incapable of producing offspring as is not copulation at
all, it is undoubtedly logical to equate the former with the latter
for divorce law purposes.45 This is what the New Jersey Court
of Chancery did in Kreyling v. Kreyling,40 where the facts
were these: The parties had sexual relations about twice a week
during the three years following the marriage, but defendant
(husband) practiced contraception on every occasion. At the
end of this period defendant stated for the first time that he did
not intend to ever have children. Upon hearing this disclosure,
plaintiff moved into a separate bedroom, and the couple lived
in a celibate manner for a year and a half. Then defendant
moved out. Three months later plaintiff petitioned for a di-
vorce, contending that her husband's act of denying her un-
contracepted intercourse for over two years amounted to deser-
tion under the New Jersey statute. The court agreed with plain-
tiff and granted her a divorce, declaring:
(I) n all of the cases in our State which lay down and fol-
low the rule that unjustified refusal of sexual intercourse
for the statutory period is a ground for divorce . . . the de-
cisions rest on the principle that refusal of sexual inter-
42 The state referred to is New Jersey. Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N. J. Misc.
52, 23 A. 2d 800 (1942).
43 27A C. J. S., Divorce § 36(3) (1959).
44 This justification was advanced in the leading case of Raymond v. Ray-
mond, 79 A. 430 (N. J., 1909), where a woman divorced a mate who had
denied her sexual intercourse throughout their six-year marriage:
"The human race was created male and female with the manifest pur-
pose of perpetuating the race. Marriage without sexual intercourse
utterly defeats its purpose . . . The controlling purpose of marriage is
to enable the sexes to gratify lawfully the natural desire for procreation
which has been implanted in them . . ."
45 Nevertheless, this writer opposes equating the two, for the reason stated
in the last paragraph of this article.
46 Supra n. 42.
Sept., 1965
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course prevents the procreation of children and thereby
deprives marriage of . . . its most important object . . . Cer-
tainly the result of the defendant's conduct in the instant
case was the same as the result of . . . refusal to have any
intercourse. .. 4
The Kreyling doctrine remains the law in New Jersey48 and
may well achieve acceptance in some of the other jurisdictions
which treat a wilful refusal to have sexual relations as desertion
if continued for the period specified by the desertion act.
Although a few states deem the prolonged and unjustified
refusal of coitus to be cruelty justifying a divorce,49 there are,
to date, no reported decisions granting a complainant a divorce
on the ground of cruelty solely because the respondent con-
ditioned coitus upon contraception. It therefore appears that the
following quotation is applicable to all American jurisdictions:
The avoidance of procreation of children by one spouse
over the objections of the other, or the refusal of one spouse
to engage in sexual intercourse unless contraception is prac-
ticed does not authorize the granting of a divorce on the
ground of cruelty . . .50
However, there is good reason to believe that refusal of un-
contracepted intercourse will be considered cruelty if coupled
with other objectionable acts.5 1
To summarize, in England a spouse no longer can obtain
an annulment on the ground of "wilful refusal . . . to consum-
mate the marriage" merely because his mate insists upon the
use of contraceptives or the practice of coitus interruptus. This
ground is not an express cause for annulment or divorce in any
American jurisdiction. In England a spouse cannot have his
marriage annulled on the ground of fraud because his partner
falsely promised-expressly or impliedly-before marriage that
the couple would have children afterward; but in most Ameri-
47 Id., at 803-04 of 23 A. 2d.
48 The Kreyling rule has been restricted slightly by the subsequent case of
Kirk v. Kirk, 39 N. J. Super. 341, 120 A. 2d 854 (1956), which held that
plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he strongly
objected to defendant's conduct (the latter's insistence upon the taking of
preventive measures) throughout the statutory desertion period. In the
Kirk case the petitioner (a wife) was denied a divorce for failing to meet
this requirement.
49 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation § 80 (1957).
50 Id. at § 81.
51 4 A. L. R. 2d 227 (1949), and the English case of Cackett v. Cackett,
supra n. 21.
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can jurisdictions such an annulment is available under these
circumstances. 52 In at least one state (New Jersey) a husband
or wife can procure a divorce on the ground of desertion if his
(her) spouse unjustifiably conditions sexual intercourse upon
contraception for the statutory desertion period; however, this
is not true in the great majority of states or in England. And
finally, the prolonged and unjustified refusal of uncontracepted
coitus is, by itself, considered cruelty in neither England nor
the United States; but if the refusal is accompanied by other
objectionable conduct, a divorce for cruelty may be obtain-
able.
Notwithstanding our society's wide acceptance of birth
control, it seems evident that an annulment for fraud should be
available to one whose mate falsely promised to have children
following marriage. It also seems apparent that an annulment
for fraud is warranted where the promise was merely implied,
for most persons assume-in the absence of contrary indica-
tions-that their prospective spouse intends to have at least one
or two children. However, it does not appear rational to grant
a divorce for desertion merely because there has been a long-
continuing refusal to bear offspring, since a persistent refusal to
have children bears little resemblance to an abandonment of
one's spouse. To hold that a prolonged denial of all sexual inter-
course constitutes desertion represents a sufficient stretching
of the desertion concept. Finally, it does not appear desirable to
make a divorce for cruelty available to a husband or wife in
this kind of fact situation. If the complainant has been deceived
by his mate (with reference to the latter's willingness to have
children), then an annulment for fraud is usually procurable,
and if he has not been deceived, then his spouse's conduct can-
not reasonably be deemed cruel.
52 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Annulment of Marriage § 17 (1962).
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